Chemical Plant Bomb Threat Planning Handbook

March 2002

Craig S. Gundry, CPS
Critical Intervention Services, Inc.

A NOTE REGARDING THIS MANUAL

Most traditional approaches to bomb threat planning rely on the assumptions that a facility has a relatively large security staff and operations that can be abandoned to permit a quick and complete evacuation. Unfortunately, these types of approaches do not account for the unique circumstances often present at chemical facilities. Issues such as process safety, security personnel deployment, facility size and layout, and dispersion of employees often limit the feasibility of adopting conventional bomb threat management strategies commonly used in offices and other environments.

This handbook is designed to aid plant managers and security planners in developing effective bomb threat management protocols for chemical facilities. The methodologies described in this document are based on established principles and modified, as necessary, to account for the conditions present at most chemical manufacturing, storage, and distribution facilities.

For additional assistance in bomb threat planning, security risk assessment, or anti-terrorism planning for RMP facilities, contact:

Craig S. Gundry, CPS
Vice President of Special Projects
Critical Intervention Services, Inc.
1261 South Missouri Ave.
Clearwater, FL 33756
Tel. (727) 461-9417
Fax (727) 449-1269
Email: cgundry@cisworldservices.org

Chemical Plant Bomb Threat Planning Handbook

Table of Contents

1. Characteristics of Bomb Threats

Telephoned threats persist as the most common bomb-related problem faced by businesses and communities. Every year, thousands of threat calls are received by organizations ranging from large corporate offices to schools and churches. Fortunately, most of these threats are fictitious. In most locations, over 99% of bomb threats turn out to be either hoaxes aimed at instilling panic and disrupting a particular activity, or nothing more than thoughtless pranks—perpetrated for the caller's amusement.

Though it is tempting to dismiss all bomb threats as hoaxes, bombers do occasionally provide warning before attacks. In most of these cases, the bomber is trying to reduce the risk of casualties by providing a chance for evacuation. In this situation, the bomber often perceives killing or injuring innocent bystanders as counter-productive. Many terrorists realize that a high number of civilian casualties often produces adverse publicity and may possibly alienate support for their cause. Moreover, many terrorists use bomb threats to ensure that proper credit is given to the group or to provide a rationale for the bombing. In many of these cases, the bomb threat is called in to a news organization, such as a newspaper or television station.

Though most authentic bomb threats are delivered with the intention of sparing innocent lives, many terrorist groups employ deceptive bomb threats as part of carefully planned operations designed to achieve specific strategic goals. In some of these situations, the bomb threat is used to deceptively lure people to the location of a bomb in order to create a high number of casualties. In other cases, the bomb threat may be crafted in such a way as to deliberately discredit police and emergency responders. Though malicious bomb threat situations are rare, it is important that plant security planners consider the possibility of these risks when developing facility response protocols.

Following is a description of a few of the most common "malicious" strategies associated with bomb threats.

The "Mousetrap"

A number of terrorist groups have used threat calls to deliberately target police and bomb disposal personnel. In this situation, the bomb threat is used specifically to lure bomb disposal technicians to the location of a boobytrapped or remote-controlled device. In the latter case, a terrorist observing from a nearby location activates the device once bomb technicians or police have entered the "kill zone."

False Bomb Location

The objective of this type of scenario is to cause maximum casualties (and public fear). In this situation, the bomber places the call with prior knowledge of how police or security will evacuate the area. A device is then concealed near the suspected assembly point or along the evacuation route. Once people have collected at the assembly point, the device explodes (activated by time delay or remote-control).

The 1998 bombing in Omagh, Northern Ireland was a dramatic example of this. In the Omagh incident, a caller told police that a bomb was located outside of the local courthouse. To verify his authenticity, the caller provided a code word known only to the IRA and British authorities. The police initiated an immediate evacuation of the surrounding area. Forty minutes later, as people began to assemble a safe distance away from the courthouse, 500 pounds of explosive detonated in the evacuation zone—killing 28 people and injuring 220 others.

Short Warnings

In this scenario, the terrorists deliver a warning with full awareness that the police will not have sufficient time to evacuate the area, identify the device, and safely dispose of it. This places the police in a difficult position. Despite their best efforts to respond, public attention after the attack easily shifts from the perpetrators to the police with speculations of "Why wasn't response more effective?". This increases public anxiety and erosion of the public's faith in the authorities. In addition to its psychological impact, short warnings increase risk to responders—particularly bomb technicians preparing or executing render safe procedures (RSP).

Bomb Threat Perpetrators

There are three categories of bomb threat callers that should be considered in a bomb threat plan for a chemical facility:

1. Hoax Caller

As noted previously, the majority of bomb threat calls in the United States are hoax calls aimed at disrupting facility operations, intimidating management and employees, or perpetrated for the caller's amusement. Possible sources of hoax calls at chemical facilities include disgruntled employees, local environmental activists, local residents angered over land issues, or mischievous juveniles.

2. Malevolent Individual

Though the probability is relatively low, it is possible that an individual citizen with a particular grievance against a chemical company could place a bomb at a facility with the intention of targeting personnel and/or property. In this situation, a threat call may be used in conjunction with the delivery of the bomb to permit evacuation, to divert attention from another crime (a.k.a. crime concealment), or to provide a rationale for the bombing.

This category (Malevolent Individuals) also includes extortionists. Over the past thirty years, there have been a number of genuine bomb threats in the U.S. directed against corporate targets accompanied by extortion demands.

3. Terrorist

In the aftermath of September 11th, it is vital all facilities with operations that could adversely affect the local public consider the potential of terrorist attacks. In the chemical industry, the locations at greatest risk would be RMP sites located close to population centers. Though the probability of terrorist attacks against chemical plants is generally low, all facilities classified as RMP sites should take reasonable measures to prepare for terrorist attacks, including the possibility of a terrorist bomb threat.

So you think that it can't happen to you?.....

When many people think of bomb threat targets, the first thoughts that come to their minds are schools, office buildings, courthouses, and government facilities. Very rarely do people consider industrial facilities as targets for bomb threats. However, as history has demonstrated, chemical facilities have been the target of bomb threats and bombings, and to ignore this fact can be quite costly. Consider the Ascension Parish bomb threats as one example...

At 6:03 a.m. on October 16, 2001, a chemical plant near Baton Rouge, LA received a phone call claiming that two bombs were concealed in the facility. Management responded by releasing all contract workers for the day and contacting the police. After a search, no bomb was found. Three days later an envelope with white powder and a letter was discovered at the same facility. The letter contained another bomb threat. This was followed by a third bomb threat on October 22 which required disruption of operations and search of the facility.

On October 23, a different facility near the first plant received a bomb threat. This was followed one day later with yet another threat at a third facility. In all of these instances, no bombs were found. Yet, the loss due to disruption of operations was quite severe.

To minimize potential loss and liability, it is important that every chemical facility has an effective bomb threat management plan to direct response and recovery from bomb threat situations.

2. Bomb Threat Planning

To manage the problem of bomb threats effectively, all chemical facilities should develop a bomb threat response plan.

Several issues need to be considered while a bomb threat response plan is being developed:

1. Level of Threat
2. Nature of the Organization's Structure and Activities
3. Critical Process Activities
4. Facility Layout
5. Outside Resources (law enforcement, canine search teams, etc.)
6. Access Vulnerability
7. Communications Capabilities
8. Safety
9. Legal Issues

Level of Threat

Accurate threat assessment is essential in determining appropriate response actions to a bomb threat. For example, facilities with low levels of threat may decide to use searches of the work area by employees and to limit evacuations only to situations where a suspicious object is identified. Other facilities, with higher levels of risk, may decide on a full evacuation regardless of whether a suspicious object is identified or not.

Nature of the Facility's Structure and Activities

The facility's employee structure will determine who is responsible for different activities during a bomb threat. For example, a facility with a low number of security personnel may require considerable assistance from employees in searching various areas of the building. Additionally, the management structure will determine who will make the decision to evacuate or reoccupy the facility and how information will be communicated to employees.

Critical Process Activities

Critical process operations at the facility need to be considered in determining what activities can be shut down during a threat and what needs to remain in operation. If a critical activity cannot be stopped during a threat, what provisions can be made to ensure the safety of people and equipment required to sustain that activity during the initial response? Additionally, at what point does the activity need to be shut down and personnel evacuated? How long would it take to safely shut down a critical activity? These are very important issues that need to be considered during the planning phase.

Facility Layout

The layout of the facility will dictate how search zones are assigned and where evacuation routes and assembly areas should be located. The size of the facility in relation to the physical dispersion of employees throughout the site will also influence how various areas are searched.

Outside Resources

What resources from local law enforcement are available to assist with search and evacuation? In most locations (including all of the Florida site jurisdictions), police respond only in the event that a suspect object is identified. In other locations, police may be willing to dispatch officers or a canine team to assist in searching the facility.

Access Vulnerability

How effective are existing security measures in preventing bombs from entering the facility? Facilities with open access to the public may need to search a location much more thoroughly than a site with strong security measures. Conversely, facilities with well-developed access control and screening systems may wish to limit searches of secured areas while intensifying search of public locations outside the secured areas.

Communications Capabilities

One of the most important tasks in developing a bomb threat plan is establishing a safe and effective system for communications. Internal and external communications systems, such as number and location of telephones, radios, intercoms, and loudspeaker systems have a strong impact on how the bomb threat communication and control system is established.

Safety

Safety is the most important consideration in conducting a bomb search. All procedures for search and evacuation should be carefully designed to minimize risk to the facility's occupants.

NOTE: Search safety issues are addressed later in this document.

Legal Issues

A number of potential legal issues need to be considered when developing a bomb threat management plan. One of the most important of these issues is the role of non-security employees in bomb search and response activities. One approach to conducting bomb searches relies on employees to conduct complete searches of their work areas following a bomb threat. In unionized working environments, utilizing employees in this type of capacity may violate union agreements. This is an issue that needs to be explored with legal counsel of a site-by-site basis.

Poor execution of the written search plan is another issue to consider. If an organization improperly executes a well-developed and documented response plan, the organization may be exposed to lawsuits arising from negligence.

Considering the information contained in the previous section, complete Worksheet #1.

Worksheet 1: Initial Planning Considerations

Complete the following questions. Your responses will aid in determining which search and response approaches will work best for your facility.

1. What is the relative level of threat probability at your facility? _____

The level of threat (with regard to bomb-related risks) is generally low at most chemical facilities. However, the following factors may indicate a heightened level of threat probability:

- RMP processes and close proximity to population centers
- A history of previous bomb threats
- A history of employee threats or workplace violence
- Conflict with local environmentalists
- Conflict with local land owners or residents
- Conflict with labor unions

2. How many security personnel are employed during shifts at your facility?

_____

The number of security personnel on duty will influence your ability to use the security team search method for conducting bomb searches.

3. How many supervisory personnel are on duty during various working shifts?

_____

The number of supervisors on duty will influence your ability to use the security team search

method for conducting bomb searches and your selection of "floor wardens" under the employee work area search method.

4. How many hazmat responders are on duty during various working shifts?

_____

If employees are uncooperative about participating in bomb search activities, hazmat team members may be a useful source of personnel to supplement search teams. By virtue of their status as hazmat team members, they have already assumed a degree of physical risk as part of their job responsibilities.

5. What types of critical process activities cannot be shut down immediately or safely abandoned during a bomb threat?

_____

5.1 How many people must remain at their locations to monitor critical process activities during a search or evacuation? _____

5.2 How much time is required to safely shut down critical process operations and evacuate personnel assigned to those activities? _____

6. How are employees deployed throughout the facility during normal operations? (Refer below)

6.1 Are employees evenly distributed throughout the facility or are they concentrated in certain areas? _____

6.2 Do most employees work in an assigned area or do their work activities require moving throughout the facility? _____

6.3 Are there any large areas within the facility that are usually not occupied by employees? _____

7. Are most locations throughout the facility "well-kept" and free of garbage, overgrown foliage, scrap metal, and other items that can impede search activities?

_____

8. Can process areas and equipment be easily inspected visually for the presence of unusual objects or signs of tampering? _____

9. Will local police aid in conducting a search of the facility during a bomb threat?_____ *(Contact your local police for assistance with this question)*

If YES:

9.1 Are the local police properly trained in bomb search techniques? _____

9.2 How many police officers would normally be dispatched to assist with a search? _____

9.3 Would the local police be normally supplemented with a trained explosive detection K9? _____

10. What organization (police or fire dept. bomb squad, military EOD unit, etc.) is responsible for render safe procedures in the event that a possible bomb is discovered during a search? _____

10.1 What is the average response time for the bomb squad? _____

(Contact your local police for assistance with questions 10 and 10.1)

11. Does the facility employ access controls that would impair a bomber's ability to enter and leave the facility undetected? _____

If YES:

11.1 Are there any locations on-site that are not protected by access controls (areas that would be easily accessible to the public--parking lots, entrances/exits, building lobbies, etc.)?

_____

In a secured environment, publicly accessible areas should be given priority attention during search activities. History has demonstrated that these are the locations most likely to be targeted in a large facility or facility employing access controls.

12. What types of communications systems are used throughout the facility?

12.1 Are all supervisors and employees assigned to remote areas accessible via telephone during normal operations? _____

12.2 Does the facility telephone system have internal conference call capabilities? _____

12.3 Is there a loudspeaker system on-site?_____

12.4 Is there an audible emergency alert system on-site that does NOT have a specified meaning (other than "emergency")? _____

IMPORTANT NOTE: Audible alarms dedicated for fire, chemical release evacuation, and other specific emergencies should NEVER be used to signal a bomb threat.

13. Are employees unionized or contracted from other companies? _____

If YES:

13.1 Are there any legal restrictions prohibiting employee or contractor participation in bomb search activities? _____

(If necessary, contact legal counsel for advice on this issue..)

14. What is the "employee culture" like at the facility? (Refer below)

14.1 Are employees generally supportive of the company and facility management? _____

14.2 Are employees supportive in participating in other emergency response programs (hazmat response, etc.)? _____

14.3 Do employees function well under pressure? _____

One approach to searching facilities for bombs requires the active participation of employees. If employees are prone to panic or refuse to participate in search activities, an alternative method must be used.

Developing a Bomb Threat Protocol

There are several steps in developing an effective bomb threat plan:

1. Designate responsibilities.
2. Define procedures for handling threat calls.
3. Determine procedures for evaluating threat calls.
4. Identify an Incident Command Point (ICP).
5. Develop a search and evacuation plan.
6. Establish response procedure.

This document will address each step of the planning process while describing different alternatives for search, evacuation, and response.

Step One: Designate Responsibilities

The first step in developing a bomb threat response plan at a chemical facility is assigning an incident commander. This person will be responsible for evaluating the original threat, supervising search activities, ordering necessary evacuations, supervising response to any suspect objects, and determining when the facility can be reentered. In most cases, the senior security or safety manager should be designated as the incident commander.

Additionally, alternative incident commanders should be designated in the event that the primary one is not present when a threat is received.

In addition to the incident commander, a communications network should be established through the organization's chain of command to ensure that employees are properly informed and supervised while responding to the threat. This chain of command usually works best if it mirrors the organization's existing management structure. To ensure that all parties are aware of their role, this communications network should be completely described in writing at the time the plan is developed.

In an ideal situation, an individual under the incident commander's supervision will notify all operations supervisors or designated "floor wardens" of the bomb threat and instruct them to initiate the response procedure. Each operations supervisor or floor warden then notifies his employees of the threat and supervises their search or evacuation activities.

To aid the incident commander in managing the various activities required to control bomb threat response, a "runner" should be designated. The runner is responsible for notifying supervisors and management about the threat, hand-relaying messages if necessary, and assisting in securing the location of any suspect objects while waiting for the police. The runner is also tasked with any miscellaneous needs (such as receiving arriving police, unlocking gates for emergency responders, etc.). At least one runner and one alternate runner should be designated for each working shift.

Worksheet 2: Employee Responsibilities

The following worksheet is designed to aid in designating responsibilities for managing a bomb threat. Fill in the blanks by writing in the name of the appropriate employee.

1. Identify an incident commander: _____

   This person will be the primary individual responsible for assessing threat calls, ordering and supervising search and evacuation, and re-occupation of the facility.

2. Identify alternate incident commanders: _____,

_____, _____, _____

   These individuals will serve as incident commander in the absence of the primary incident commander. Alternate incident commanders should be selected to ensure 24-hour presence

(for facilities with 24-hour operations) and redundancy (in the event that another incident commander is away from the facility).

3. Identify all personnel who answer "outside" telephone lines:

_____, _____, _____

_____, _____, _____

These individuals will need to be trained in proper procedures for handling bomb threat calls. This will usually include all receptionists or employees that answer publicly listed telephone numbers.

4. Identify individuals to serve as "runners": _____,

_____, _____, _____

These individuals will physically communicate instructions from the incident commander to the search teams or floor wardens. At least one runner should be designated for each working shift. The runner should ideally be selected as an employee who works in close proximity to the incident commander during normal operations.

5. Identify "floor wardens": _____, _____,

_____, _____, _____

_____, _____, _____

During a bomb threat, floor wardens are tasked with supervising search activities and evacuations of different parts of the facility. In most cases, floor wardens are selected as department or operations supervisors or senior employees in different locations throughout the facility. Each floor warden is responsible for a particular physical zone. Ideally, the floor warden should be assigned to the area that he/she supervises during normal operations.

6. Identify all security and maintenance personnel: _____,

_____, _____, _____,

_____, _____, _____

These personnel will be assigned to search teams or to searching "high-priority" locations (public areas, entrances/exits, chemical tanks, assembly areas, etc.). If the Employee Work Area Search method is used, these same personnel will also be tasked with searching areas that are not covered by a floor warden’s zone.

Step Two: Define a procedure for handling threat calls.

Most bomb threat calls are answered by a recipient on a telephone line with a publicly listed number. In smaller facilities, this usually limits the number of possible recipients to a handful of receptionists or switchboard operators. However, in many larger facilities, different offices may have publicly listed numbers answered by separate recipients. In either case, anyone responsible for answering a publicly listed telephone number should be trained in procedures for handling bomb threat calls. Moreover, each telephone used for receiving public inquiries should be furnished with a bomb threat card to assist employees in managing the call and recording information afterward.

When a threat call arrives, the person receiving the call should remain calm and use the following procedure:

- The recipient should pay close attention to the caller's message. He/she should ask the caller to repeat the message and should be sure to record or note every word the caller says.

  As a minimum, the recipient should ensure that the caller provides two vital facts:

  1. Location of the Device
  2. Time of Detonation

- If possible, the recipient should signal someone else in the room to listen in on the call. Many people are shocked when they receive a bomb threat and often overlook small details of the caller's statements. Two people will have a much better chance of remembering fine details of the call.

- The threat recipient should keep the caller on the line as long as possible. The recipient should ask what type of device it is, what it looks like, why the caller placed the bomb, who the caller is, etc. The caller should be advised that the facility is occupied and that a detonation may result in the death or injury of innocent people. The objective is to gain as much information as possible about the caller and the credibility of the threat. If the recipient is in doubt about what to ask, he/she should refer to the bomb threat card for a list of questions.

- While listening to the caller, the recipient should pay special attention to noises in the background, the sound of the caller's voice, his/her use of idiom, and any other indications of the caller's identity or the source of the call.

- After the caller hangs up, the recipient should immediately report the situation to the incident commander or a security officer. Before speaking with anyone else, the recipient should complete the questions on the bomb threat card. This ensures proper documentation of the threat while everything is fresh in the recipient's mind.

NOTE: A copy of a bomb threat card is included as an appendix to this manual.



Every phone in the facility that is used to answer outside lines should be equipped with a bomb threat card.

Step Three: Determine a procedure for evaluating threats.

At this stage, a procedure needs to be established for evaluating threats and deciding on the next course of action.

Once the threat call is received and security is notified, the incident commander should debrief the person who received the call. Before asking any questions, the incident commander should let the person who received the call describe the conversation in his/her own words. This ensures that the recipient is speaking directly from memory without the influence of outside suggestions. After he/she has finished the account, the incident commander should review the completed bomb threat card to ensure that the person recorded every detail to the best of his/her ability.

Determining the authenticity of a bomb threat is a very difficult task. In most cases, the statements of the caller alone are insufficient to enable a clear determination. However, there are some characteristics that may indicate an authentic threat. Many authentic bomb threat

callers will repeat their message in a very specific and deliberate manner. In this situation, the bomber wants to be sure that the message is accurately understood. In other cases, the bomber may reveal the location of the device. Detailed descriptions about the location of the device are strong indications that the threat is authentic. Generally, the more information provided by the caller, the greater the chances are that the call is real.

In some parts of the world, terrorist groups use coded warnings to verify the authenticity of the threat. In this situation, the caller states a code word while delivering the bomb threat. The police, once notified, understand what the code word means. While most coded warnings are called directly to police or news media organizations, coded warnings may be delivered directly to the threatened facility.

At this stage, a decision needs to be made about whether to evacuate, search, or ignore the threat. This decision should be made according to standard protocol as defined in the bomb threat plan. For example, a policy might be established stating that a search of the facility by employees will be initiated immediately after a threat is received—regardless of the circumstances of the call. In other situations, immediate evacuation and a full search by trained search teams should be conducted.

At most chemical facilities, a mandatory work area search will be the best choice as an immediate first step.

Step Four: Determine an Incident Command Point (ICP).

Once the threat response plan is initiated, the incident commander should move control operations to an incident command point (ICP). The location of the incident command point will depend on the type of search and response plan initiated. For example, if an employee work area search is initiated, the ICP should be located at an office close to the entrance or close to the exterior of the facility. If an evacuation is required, the ICP would then relocate to an alternate position outside of the building (such as a security gate shack).

To ensure that the ICP is ready to move and set up quickly, all items needed to control search and response activities should be located together in a portable ICP kit. This should contain a copy of the bomb threat response plan, a copy of the facility layout (marked with evacuation routes and search zones), emergency telephone numbers, staff rosters, internal extension numbers, etc.

A Note About Credibility Indicators

Do not base the decision to search or evacuate solely on the appearance of the threat call's credibility. Many authentic callers do not provide definitive indications that a threat is credible. Guidelines for principal decisions about search and evacuation should be established as standard policies during the initial planning process. This ensures that all response activities occur according to protocol, rather than to subjective interpretation of the situation.

So what is the value of assessing potential threat credibility?

Strong indications of threat authenticity are often useful when deciding what to do once a search or evacuation is complete. For example, what if a search is conducted and nothing is found? Should the building be evacuated or reoccupied before the time stated in the threat call? If the threat appeared credible, a decision to evacuate or postpone reoccupation until after the stated time may be justified. It is possible that the search teams did not locate the bomb.

Worksheet #3: Incident Command Point

1. Identify a primary Incident Command Point: _____

   This location should be close to the outside of the facility and equipped with a telephone with outside line and internal extension capabilities.

2. Identify a secondary Incident Command Point: _____

   This location should be outside or along the perimeter of the facility and equipped with a telephone with outside line and internal extension capabilities.

3. Prepare an ICP kit with the following items:

   ___ Written Bomb Threat Plan
   ___ Telephone Contact Sheet, including:

   - Names of Floor Wardens, Mgmt Personnel, & Maintenance Pers.
   - Internal Extension Numbers
   - Cell Phone Numbers
   - Emergency Contact Numbers

   ___ Facility Layout Diagram, displaying:

   - Search zones
   - Evacuation routes
   - Assembly areas

   NOTE: If the security team search method is used, the ICP kit should contain at last one copy of the facility layout with search zones for reference by each team. These handouts should also contain safety instructions, an outline of the response procedure, and telephone extension numbers for the primary and alternate ICPs.

   ___ Search Zone Checklist, including:

   - Description of search zones (Rooms, areas, etc.)
   - Personnel assigned to zones (Floor wardens, search team members, security personnel, etc.)

   ___ Radios or cell phones w/ fresh batteries (if search supervisors are not already equipped)

   ___ Flashlights (if search supervisors are not already equipped)

Step Five: Develop a search and evacuation plan.

The search and evacuation plan should detail the steps taken immediately after receipt of the bomb threat. The plan should also provide guidelines for making critical decisions such as when to evacuate and reoccupy the facility.

Three primary methods are used for search and evacuation in response to bomb threats:

1. Security Team Search
2. Employee Work Area Search
3. Police Assisted Search

Security Team Search

Security team searches, the first option, require that all employees evacuate the facility immediately after the threat is received. During this time, the incident command point (ICP) will be established at a location outside of the facility. Once evacuated, personnel assigned to search teams will assemble at the ICP. The search teams are then briefed on search zones and safety procedures. Once briefed, the search teams systematically search their zones until a suspect item is identified or the entire facility has been searched.

As a benefit, the security search team option places minimal responsibility on the facility's employees. However, there are several important limitations to this method. First, it requires that the facility have an adequate number of personnel trained in search procedures present at all times. At most chemical facilities, there are not enough security personnel on duty to complete this task internally. As a result, other employees will often be required to supplement security personnel. Possible sources of personnel for search teams include activity supervisors and personnel already assigned to other types of crisis management teams (hazmat responders, firefighters, etc.).

The second disadvantage to the security team search method is that many security personnel and employees are unable to recognize unusual objects in unfamiliar areas. This problem can be expected in most industrial environments, particularly in areas containing complicated process equipment.

Employee Work Area Search

Many chemical facilities do not have the security personnel assets required to conduct effective team searches. In such situations, employee work area searches are often the most practical alternative for responding to bomb threats.

In an employee work area search, the incident command point remains in the facility at a location with adequate communications. Once the threat is received, the incident commander instructs a runner to contact each supervisor/floor warden (ideally by phone-if not, by radio). Each supervisor/floor warden is advised of the threat and instructed to initiate a search of his/her work area. The floor wardens, in turn, ensure that each employee searches his/her personal work area. While each department or operations area is conducting its search, security and maintenance personnel search the exterior of the facility and all common areas. As each "department" completes its search, everyone in that department will either remain or evacuate to an assembly area outside of the building (according to protocol).

Employee work area searches offer a number of benefits. First, people working in a particular area know what belongs there and what doesn't. This is particularly valuable in an equipment-intensive environment, such as a manufacturing or distribution facility. It is very difficult for a security officer searching an unfamiliar area to recognize what belongs and what does not. Furthermore, when everyone in the facility is searching a small area, the time required to conduct the search is dramatically reduced.

To be successful, the individuals designated as floor wardens should be trained in search safety and in how to supervise the search and evacuation of their employees. This training should be provided before an incident occurs and practiced in periodic drills. Additionally, a written description of this procedure, complete with instructions for search safety, should be provided to each floor warden for future reference.

Police Assisted Search

This type of search is similar to the security team search method. In this situation, local law enforcement officers are included as search team members to augment the facility's security and employee staff. The basic sequence of activities is the same as the security team search protocol, beginning with an evacuation of all employees and establishment of an ICP. Once local police have arrived on-site, they are paired with volunteer employees into teams and assigned to specific search zones. Once they have been briefed, the teams systematically search their zones until a suspect item is identified or the entire facility has been searched.

If the local police have access to an explosive detection dog, this unit should be initially assigned to searching all public areas and the exterior of the building. Once this search is complete, the canine unit can be reassigned to supplement the search teams in sweeping other areas inside the building.

Police assisted searches are particularly beneficial in situations where there is an inadequate number of facility security personnel to conduct an efficient security team search. Moreover, law enforcement officers participating in the search can request additional assistance or report the situation directly through their internal communications system. This minimizes possible delays caused by relaying communications through an emergency dispatcher.

The most common problems with police assisted searches relate to standardized training and chain of command. Not all police officers are properly trained to conduct bomb searches. If this is the case, it may be necessary to assign a trained employee to each police officer. This employee would then direct the search team's activities. Command and control issues may also arise if there is any ambiguity about responsibilities or authority. To minimize these possible problems, the security planner should work closely with police during the initial stages of developing the bomb threat response plan.

At many chemical facilities, the employee work area search method will be the most effective approach.

Evacuation Planning

Once a method of search is selected, an evacuation plan should be developed. The first step in creating the evacuation plan is designating an outdoor assembly area. This assembly area should be at least 300 feet from the facility and located away from parked cars, entrances/exits, and areas likely to be used for staging emergency vehicles. If possible, this area should also be clear of any trash dumpsters, bushes, and other items that provide an easy opportunity for concealing a bomb.

Using a plot of the facility, efficient and safe evacuation routes to the assembly area should be designated for each department or work area. To avoid exposing evacuees to the possible location of a bomb, primary and alternate evacuation routes should be established. The primary evacuation route should be designed for maximum efficiency. This is the route that will be used under normal circumstances if a suspicious object has not been located. Chemical facilities with evacuation plans for chemical release will usually be fine by using their existing emergency evacuation plans.

Alternate evacuation routes should also be mapped for each area while possible locations for a bomb are being considered. If these routes are established properly, the only employees who will need to evacuate by the alternate route are those in close proximity to the suspicious object. Employees located in departments away from the suspicious object would evacuate by the primary route.

Step Six: Designate a response procedure.

As an integral part of the search plan, a procedure should be developed to ensure effective response if a suspicious item is discovered. This response procedure should be designed to immediately evacuate all employees from the danger area, notify police, and secure the danger area from accidental intrusion. Once police arrive, the incident commander should be prepared to brief bomb technicians on the situation and on movement routes inside the facility. The response procedure should also take into account what actions will be taken after the suspicious object has been removed from the site, including any follow-up searches and reoccupation of the facility.

The response plan should also address any hazards resulting from disruption of safe process operations. In many facilities, certain process operations must be shut down in a staged manner before all employees can evacuate. If this is the case, the response plan should identify who must stay behind to safely shut operations down while other employees evacuate. Additionally, the response plan should also include guidelines for warning local authorities if a detonation could result in chemical release.

This same protocol will also serve as a guide for responding to suspicious objects discovered during normal activities.

Search Safety

Security planners should observe the following safety guidelines when developing the search and evacuation plan (regardless of the specific method used):

1. Minimize use of wireless communications during the search.

Under certain conditions, the RF energy emitted by radios and cellular phones can initiate an electric blasting cap. To avoid the risk of accidentally detonating a bomb, avoid using radios and cellular phones for communications. However, if the only way to communicate information quickly and safely is through the use of radios, use them with caution.

NOTE: The risk of accidentally initiating an electric blasting cap by the use of a radio is much less today than it was in the past. Most blasting caps presently manufactured in North America are relatively insensitive to RF energy. However, the possibility of accidental detonation does remain and, as a result, radios should only be used in situations where there are no other practical options.

2. DO NOT allow searching for longer than 15 minutes without a rest.

It is very difficult to maintain a high degree of awareness for longer than 15 minutes. Search teams who persist beyond this point without a break may miss the subtle indications of a possible bomb.

3. Minimize the number of people participating in zone searches.

If the security team search method is used, limit the number of people assigned to searching each zone to a team of two people. Procedures for conducting room searches are addressed later in this document.

4. Ensure that all areas searched are clearly marked and recorded.

Establish a checklist with all rooms or search areas indicated by zone. As search of each zone is completed, the teams should report this to the ICP and the searched areas should be noted on the checklist. Additionally, all rooms that have been searched should be conspicuously marked with signs or tape.

5. NEVER assume that only one device is present.

Bombers have used multiple devices on numerous occasions. If one bomb is found, always assume there may be more and continue search activities until the entire building is clear.

6. NEVER assume that the time of detonation stated in the threat is accurate.

The time of detonation stated in authentic threat calls is frequently inaccurate. Moreover, some threat groups deliberately state false detonation times to confuse or discredit authorities. If there

(Continued on Page 16)

Search Safety (Continued from Page 15)

is any doubt, abandon search activities and evacuate the building at least 30 to 60 minutes prior to the time stated in the threat call, and do not resume search activities until at least 30 to 60 minutes after the stated time of detonation.

7. Thoroughly search all public areas, assembly locations, and exterior evacuation routes before evacuation.

History has proven that most devices planted in or at facilities are concealed in publicly accessible locations or near the exterior of the building, often near an entrance or exit. Evacuation procedures often require that people pass through these "high risk" locations while enroute to the assembly area. Ordering an evacuation before searching these locations often places people at a much greater risk than if they remained inside the facility at their work areas.

Search Team Safety

All personnel assigned to search activities should be briefed on the following safety points:

1. NEVER touch, move, or cover a suspicious object.

2. NEVER spend more time near a suspicious object than is necessary.

If an object is identified during a search, the search team or employees who discovered the item should note its location and appearance and immediately leave the area.

3. Minimize use radios or cellular phones during the search.

As noted earlier, the RF energy emitted by radios and cellular phones can initiate an electric blasting cap. If a suspicious object is identified during the search, radios should be turned off immediately and the incident commander should be alerted by telephone or runner. UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES should radios or cellular phones be used in close proximity of a suspicious object.

4. "If you can see the bomb, you are too close!"

If it is necessary to post a security officer or employee to secure the area surrounding a suspicious object from accidental intrusion, this individual should be instructed to place as much structural shielding between himself and the object as possible (at least several walls). He should be able to observe the hallways or areas around the object—NOT the object itself.

3. Employee Work Area Search

This section proceeds with a detailed description of the employee work area search method. This is often the most practical method for searching facilities with small security staffs, high numbers of hoax calls, or facilities with complex process equipment and operations.

Responsibilities

In the Employee Work Area Search method, responsibilities for incident management, search, and response activities are designated as follows:

Incident Commander – Overall direction of search and response. Evaluates threats, organizes essential personnel, communicates with outside responders, and makes all decisions regarding evacuation and reoccupation.

Receptionists – Gather and document threat call information. Extracts information from the bomb threat caller, documents details of the threat call, reports receipt of the threat call to the incident commander or the security officer on duty.

Runners – Assistance in managing various response activities. Communicates information between incident commander and floor wardens, aids in search of high risk or unassigned areas, secures the location of suspicious objects, and addresses miscellaneous tasks as required by the incident commander.

Floor Wardens – Supervise groups of employees in conducting work area searches. Communicates information to employees from ICP, briefs employees on search safety, supervises search and evacuation of employees, advises ICP of search progress, and maintains accountability of group employees.

Security Officer(s) - Search high risk and unassigned areas. Notifies incident commander of threat receipt, searches location stated in threat, searches high risk and unassigned areas, searches assembly areas and evacuation routes prior to employee evacuation, secures the location of suspicious objects.

Maintenance Personnel - Search high risk and unassigned areas. Aids security personnel in searching high risk and unassigned areas, and searching assembly areas and evacuation routes prior to employee evacuation.

Employees – Search individual work areas.

Chain of Communications: Employee Work Area Search



Employee Work Area Search Methodology

The following section provides a step-by-step description of the Employee Work Area Search method.

Initial Threat Response

Once the threat is received, the individual who received the call immediately notifies the security officer or incident commander and documents the call on the bomb threat card.

Once notified, the incident commander is dispatched to debrief the individual who received the call. If the caller stated a location in the threat, a security officer or runner is immediately dispatched to search that area for anything unusual. If a suspicious object is identified, the security officer or runner advises the incident commander and proceeds with the response plan.

Facility Search

If the caller did not describe a location, the incident commander instructs a runner to initiate the search plan. Ideally, a public address system is used to notify all floor wardens of the threat. In the absence of a PA system, the runner calls the designated floor wardens, advises of the threat, and instructs them to initiate a search of their zones. As a last option, radio communications would be used. In addition to instructing the floor wardens to initiate a search of their areas, the runner reminds each floor warden to advise his employees about search safety.

At the same time, the incident commander dispatches security and maintenance personnel to search all public locations (entrances/exits, office reception areas, etc.), chemical storage locations, critical process equipment, and outdoor evacuation assembly areas. Personnel conducting this search should be exceptionally alert. History has proven that most bombers avoid detection by limiting their movement in the target building to busy, publicly accessible areas—such as lobbies and restrooms.

While searching, security and maintenance personnel are alert for anything suspicious. In addition to obvious "open" bombs and unusual objects, the following items may indicate an attempt to install or conceal an IED:

- Pieces of tape
- Disturbed ground
- Scrapings or sawdust
- Electrical wire or wire insulation
- Loose boards
- Signs of prying or screwdriver marks
- Fishing line, picture wire, or string
- Partly open doors or cabinets
- Missing screws or bolts on windows or vents

At this point, the floor wardens assemble all of their employees and inform them of the threat. Each floor warden instructs his/her employees to search their work areas for anything suspicious or unusual, and when they have finished, to assemble back at the floor warden's office. Additionally, the floor warden instructs each employee in the following safety points:

- Do not touch, cover, or move a suspicious object
- Do not open any suspicious bags or boxes

If anything suspicious is identified, the employee should stop searching and report this to the floor warden immediately.

The employees then search their work areas for anything unusual or out of place. When that search is completed, the employees disconnect any electrical plugs to eliminate background noise and leave open all drawers or cabinet doors that have been searched. If the search area is indoors, the employees open any windows in their search area and leave their all doors open and unlocked. This will aid in dissipating blast pressure in the event of a detonation.

The employees then gather up their personal belongings and report back to the floor warden.

While the employees are searching their personal work areas, the floor warden or a subordinate searches any common areas within the department as well as offices or work areas belonging to missing employees.

Once all employees have gathered back at the floor warden's location, the floor warden notifies the ICP that the zone search is complete. The incident commander then records this and instructs the floor warden to evacuate his/her employees to the assembly location or to wait for further instructions.

If requested by the incident commander, the floor wardens evacuate all employees by way of the designated evacuation route for their locations. During the evacuation, the floor wardens ensure that everyone exits safely and moves directly to the assembly area.

> IMPORTANT NOTE 1: Bombers seeking to cause maximum casualties have targeted organizations by placing devices at suspected assembly areas. To address this risk, a security officer or maintenance technician should be dis-

patched to search the assembly area before any employees are evacuated.

IMPORTANT NOTE 2: If the facility search is not completed within 30 minutes of the stated time of detonation, all search groups inside the facility should be instructed to evacuate. If there are potentially hazardous process activities that require time to shut down, safe shutdown operations should be initiated early enough to provide 30 minutes for evacuation before the stated time of detonation.

Once the employees have finished evacuating, the floor wardens collect their employees together and ensure that everyone is accounted for. Everyone remains at the assembly area until all personnel have finished searching and evacuating.

At this point, if nothing suspicious was identified, a decision needs to be made. Depending on the incident commander's assessment of the situation, the building may be reoccupied or searched again.

Response Procedure

During the search, if anything suspicious is identified, the floor warden directing the search stops immediately and instructs his/her employees to evacuate to the outdoor assembly area. Once everyone is evacuating the area, the floor warden reports the suspicious item to the incident command point by telephone or runner. The incident commander, in turn, immediately dispatches a runner or security officer to the area.

Under no circumstances should anyone touch, cover, or move the suspect item.

Next, the incident commander or a designated runner contacts the police department and advise them that a threat was received and a suspicious object was discovered during the search. If the site is classified as an RMP site, the police should be advised of this fact and that a detonation could result in a chemical release (unless it is very obvious that process operations are not at risk).

If the object is located in a multi-story facility, additional security personnel or runners are dispatched to the floors above and below the suspect item to initiate an evacuation of all employees within 300 feet* of the suspicious object.

IMPORTANT NOTE: If areas in proximity of the suspect object require the presence of employees to maintain control of critical processes, all non-essential personnel should be evacuated and the remaining personnel should initiate a safe shut down of operations. Once the shut down is complete, the employees assigned to that task should evacuate to the outdoor assembly area.

When the security officer or runner arrives at the scene of the suspect item, the floor warden describes to the individual the location of the object. The floor warden then leaves the building and moves to the outdoor assembly area.

First, the security officer or runner ensures that everyone in adjacent areas has evacuated. Once the security officer has ensured that the area is clear, the officer or runner moves to a safe location where the suspect object can be secured from accidental intrusion by other employees. At this point, the officer contacts the ICP by telephone and advises that the area is secure.

Meanwhile, security officers or runners dispatched to the other two floors instruct all remaining employees to evacuate. While evacuating, employees the alternate evacuation route to avoid moving under or over the location of the suspect object. Once the other two floors are secure, the ICP is notified. The officers then post themselves to secure the floor from accidental intrusion, while remaining as far away from the danger area as possible.

In most jurisdictions a police patrol unit will arrive on scene before the bomb disposal or Explosive Ordnance Disposal team. With the responding police officer assuming legal authority, security personnel or runners continue to secure the area from intrusion until the bomb disposal unit arrives.

Meanwhile, the incident commander instructs the floor wardens to assemble all employees who witnessed the suspect item. Equipped with a copy of the building layout, the incident commander posts outdoors with the patrol unit.

To ensure that all employees are accounted for, the incident commander instructs all floor wardens to assemble their employees.

While waiting for the bomb disposal or Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) team to arrive, the incident commander uses the facility plot to locate a safe approach route with an elevator (depending on the location of the suspect item). While most EOD robots are capable of climbing stairs, it may be much more efficient to use an elevator.

Once the bomb disposal unit or EOD team arrives, they will assume authority from the police officer on scene. Next, the bomb technicians debrief any employees who witnessed the suspicious object concerning the item's exact location and appearance.

The incident commander provides the bomb disposal unit with the facility plot and briefs the team members on safe routes to the location of the item.

Once the bomb technicians have moved inside the building, the two individuals posted on adjacent floors evacuate to the assembly area.

After bomb disposal personnel have arrived on the floor where the suspicious object is located, the security officer or runner posted on that floor directs technicians to its location. Once the technicians have located the object, the security officer or runner immediately evacuates the area and returns to the ICP for further instructions.

The crisis is not over once the suspect item is removed or rendered safe. Terrorist and criminal bombers frequently use more than one device in an attack. Therefore, the search should resume as soon as the facility is clear of the first device.

If the first item was verified as a bomb, the incident commander requests all security and maintenance personnel and floor wardens to assemble at the ICP. With police assistance, security, maintenance, and management personnel finish searching the facility until the entire facility is clear.

*The evacuation distance of 300 feet (with wall barriers) is a general rule for suspicious objects smaller than a briefcase.

4. Security Team Search

This section proceeds with a detailed description of the Security Team Search method. This is the most commonly used method for conducting bomb searches in environments with mid-large size security staffs.

Responsibilities

In the Security Team Search method, responsibilities for incident management, search, and response activities are designated as follows:

Incident Commander – Overall direction of search and response. Evaluates threats, organizes essential personnel, communicates with outside responders, and makes all decisions regarding evacuation and reoccupation.

Receptionists – Gather and document threat call information. Extracts information from the bomb threat caller, documents details of the threat call, reports receipt of the threat call to the incident commander or the security officer on duty.

Runners – Assistance in managing various response activities. Communicates information between incident commander, floor wardens, and search teams, aids in search of high risk or unassigned areas, secures the location of suspicious objects, and addresses miscellaneous tasks as required by the incident commander.

Employee Supervisors – Supervise groups of employees in evacuating the facility. Communicates information to employees from ICP, directs evacuation of employees, and maintains accountability of employees.

Security Officer(s) - Search high risk and unassigned areas. Notifies incident commander of threat receipt, searches as team members or independently (unassigned areas), searches assembly areas and evacuation routes prior to employee evacuation, secures the location of suspicious objects.

Search Team Members - Search designated search zones. Aids supervisors in evacuating employees, searches designated search zones, reports progress to ICP, and secures the area around suspicious objects from accidental intrusion. Normally composed of security personnel, supervisors, and employee volunteers.

Security Team Search Methodology

The following section provides a step-by-step description of the Security Team Search method.

Initial Threat Response

Once the threat is received, the individual who answered the call immediately notifies the security department and documents the call on a bomb threat card. Once notified, the incident commander is dispatched to debrief the individual who received the call.

If the caller stated a location in the threat, a security officer is immediately dispatched to search that area for anything unusual. If a suspicious object is identified, the security officer advises the incident commander and proceeds with the response plan.



Facility Search

If the caller did not describe a location, the incident commander instructs a runner or subordinate to initiate the search plan. Ideally, a public address system is used to notify all supervisors of the threat. In the absence of a PA system, the subordinate calls a designated supervisor or representative for each "department," advises of the threat, and instructs the supervisor to initiate a preliminary search of his/her department.

The supervisor for each "department" instructs the other department employees to conduct a cursory check of their work area for anything suspicious, disconnect all electrical plugs to avoid background noises, unlock their office doors, gather their personal articles, and assemble near the front of the group work area.

While employees are checking their work areas, security personnel or runners are dispatched to search the evacuation assembly area and all evacuation routes. Particular attention should be given to entrances/exits and publicly accessible areas.

Once the employees have finished their tasks and assembled with the group supervisor, the supervisor directs the employees' evacuation to an outdoor assembly area by the route designated for their work group. Employees assigned to critical process activities remain at their stations and initiate a safe shut down of operations. During this time, the security department establishes an ICP at a predetermined location outside of the building.

Once all employees have evacuated the building, all security and volunteer search personnel assemble at the ICP. At the same time, the incident commander instructs all group supervisors to assemble their personnel and account for all missing employees.

At the ICP, each volunteer is paired with a security officer and assigned to a search zone corresponding with the volunteer's "department." Security and maintenance personnel are organized into teams of two and assigned to search all common areas and high-risk public locations.

Once everyone is familiar with his search zones, the incident commander briefs all personnel on communications. All radios are turned off and search teams are instructed to use desk phones to report their status to the ICP.

Finally, all search teams are briefed on safety and response:

- DO NOT touch, cover, or move a suspicious object
- DO NOT open any suspicious bags or packages

If a suspicious item is identified, the search team should stop immediately and call the ICP from the nearest desk phone.

Once all search personnel are properly briefed, each search team is issued a facility plot, a roll of tape, and a flashlight (if necessary). Next, the search teams depart the ICP and begin searching their zones.

Two-Man Room Search Technique

The following is a description of a standard method developed by bomb experts for sys - tematically searching rooms for explosive devices. Though this technique was originally developed for use in buildings, the same prin - ciples can be adapted for use in searching outdoor locations and plant process areas.

1. When the two-man search team enters the first room, they should move to opposite sides of the room and stand quietly, listening for the sound of a clockwork device. Often, a device using a clockwork time delay can be heard if the room is sufficiently quiet.

NOTE: Air conditioners, heating systems, and environmental sounds can often mask the ticking of a device or distract the attention of search teams. If possible, searchers should turn off the air conditioning in the room or call the ICP and request that HVAC is turned off.

2. To ensure that the room is searched com- pletely, the search team will divide the room horizontally and vertically into progressive search zones. First, the security officer should look around the room and divide the room into horizontal search heights for multiple sweeps.

The first search sweep will usually cover all items from the floor up to waist height.

The second sweep will usually cover all items from the waist to the shoulders in height.

The third sweep will usually cover all items from the shoulders to the ceiling.

The fourth sweep will cover light fixtures, vents, and areas above drop ceilings.

After the room is divided horizontally, it should be divided vertically into two parts. This divi- sion should be based on the number and type of objects in the room. An imaginary line is drawn through the center of the room to a ref- erence point on the far wall. The search team

Horizontal Search Heights



Vertical Room Division



Illustrations extracted from ATF P 7550.2

will split up and sweep everything on opposite sides of the room up to that point, and then back through the center of the room.

3. Once the room has been divided vertically, search team personnel should face the wall at the same point and begin searching along the wall in opposite directions. During this sweep, the search team is inspecting all items up to their waist—the first search height. As the search team progresses around the room, they should pay close attention to any unusual or out of place objects. They should look under rugs, chairs, and desks while being cautious not to disturb anything.

While searching, security personnel should be alert for anything suspicious. In addition to obvious "open" bombs and unusual objects,

(Continued on Page 23)

Room Search Technique (Continued from Page 22)

the following items may indicate an attempt to install or conceal an IED:

- Pieces of tape
- Disturbed ground
- Scrapings or sawdust
- Electrical wire or wire insulation
- Loose boards
- Signs of prying or screwdriver marks
- Fishing line, picture wire, or string
- Partly open doors or cabinets
- Missing screws or bolts on windows or vents

Air conditioning and heating vents under waist height should be inspected for any signs of tampering.

When the two searchers meet on the opposite side of the room, they should proceed back through the center of the room while continuing to search all items up to the first search height.

4. Once the first sweep is complete, the search team should face the wall again at the same starting point used for the first sweep. Inspecting all objects in the second search height (waist to shoulders), the search team repeats the procedure used during the first sweep—working toward the far side wall and back through the middle of the room.

5. When the second sweep is complete, the next search height (shoulders to ceiling) is identified and the search team sweeps the room again.

6. Once that sweep is complete, the search team will systematically check the fourth sweep area. Working from one side of the room to the other, the team will inspect any light fixtures, sound speakers, air conditioning vents, and the area above any drop ceilings.

7. When the room search is complete, the team will place a piece of tape at shoulder height, across the doorjamb, to indicate that the room has been searched.

Once the first room has been searched, the team repeats the procedure for the next room or area—systematically progressing in a sequential manner until the entire search zone is clear.

Once all areas in the zone have been searched, the team calls the ICP and notifies the incident commander that the search is complete. At this point, the team may be deployed elsewhere to expedite the building search or instructed to return to the ICP.

As each team reports their status, the incident commander records on the search checklist the areas that have been searched.

After all teams have reported that nothing suspicious was identified, a decision needs to be made. Depending on the incident commander's assessment of the situation, the building may be reoccupied or searched again.

Response Procedure

During the search, if anything suspicious is identified, the search team stops immediately and report the suspicious item to the ICP.

NOTE: Under no circumstances should anyone touch, cover, or move the suspect item.

Next, the incident commander contacts the police department and advises them that a suspicious object was discovered during the search. If the site is classified as an RMP site, the police should be advised of this fact and that a detonation could result in a chemical release (unless it is very obvious that process operations are not at risk).

While the ICP is contacting the authorities, a runner is sent to instruct the search teams to stop and immediately return to the ICP.

Meanwhile, the search team that discovered the object records its location and appearance in addition to opening all doors and windows in the room. This will aid in dissipating blast pressure in the event of a detonation.

The volunteer search team member then evacuates to the ICP. The remaining security officer posts himself outside of the hazard area where he/she can view approaches to the location of the object. The security officer remains at this protected location to secure the danger area from accidental intrusion.

In most jurisdictions, a police patrol unit will arrive on the scene before the bomb disposal or Explosive Ordnance Disposal team. With the responding police officer assuming legal authority, the security officer continues to secure the area from intrusion until the bomb disposal unit arrives.

While waiting for the bomb disposal or EOD team to arrive, the incident commander uses the facility plot to locate a safe approach route with an elevator (depending on the location of the suspect item). While most EOD robots are capable of climbing stairs, it may be much more efficient to use an elevator.

Once the bomb disposal unit or EOD team arrives, they assume authority from the police officer on scene. Next, the bomb technicians debrief any employees who witnessed the suspicious object concerning the item's exact location and appearance.

The incident commander provides the bomb disposal unit with the facility plot and briefs the team members on safe routes to the location of the suspicious object.
Once bomb disposal personnel have arrived on the floor where the suspicious object is located, the security officer posted on that floor directs technicians to its location. Once the technicians have located the object, the security officer immediately moves to the outdoor assembly area.

The crisis is not over once the suspect item is removed or rendered safe. Terrorist and criminal bombers frequently use more than one device in an attack. Therefore, the search should resume as soon as the building is clear of the first device. Once police approve, the incident commander requests all teams to return to their search zones. The search proceeds until the entire building is clear.

NOTE: If the first item was verified as a bomb, police and EOD personnel will usually provide assistance in completing the extended search.

Appendix A: Bomb Threat Checklist

Telephone no. call was received at:_____ Exact time of call:_____

Exact words of the caller:_____

_____

_____

QUESTIONS TO ASK:

1. When is the bomb going to explode? _____

2. Where is the bomb? _____

3. What does it look like? _____

4. What kind of bomb is it? _____

5. What will cause it to explode? _____

6. Did you place the bomb? _____

7. Why did you place the bomb? _____

8. Where are you calling from? _____

9. What is your name? _____

CALLER'S VOICE:

Calm	Disguised	Nasal	Angry	Broken
Stutter	Slow	Sincere	Lisp	Rapport
Giggling	Deep	Crying	Squeaky	Excited
Stressed	Accent	Loud	Slurred	Normal

If the voice is familiar, whom did it sound like?_____

Were there any background noises?_____

Remarks:_____

_____

Call _____ at ext. _____ to report the bomb threat immediately.

Appendix B. Frequently Asked Questions

The following section contains answers to common questions regarding bomb threat management

1. Q. What should we do if the facility is very large and there is not enough people to search the facility within a reasonable period of time?

A. This is a common situation in many chemical manufacturing and distribution facilities. Depending on the circumstances, there are several ways that this problem can be approached. First, identify all of the "high-risk" locations inside of the facility. This includes sensitive process areas, control and information system locations, and publicly accessible areas (entrances/exits, building lobbies, reception areas, etc.). These locations should receive priority attention as far as search is concerned. If there is inadequate time to search the entire facility, focus initial search activities on these high-risk areas. Areas within the facility that are located away from process activities and personnel (scrap yards, empty rail cars, etc.) should be given lesser priority and, if necessary, can usually be safely omitted from the search.

Next, consider the condition of the areas to be searched. Large, outdoor areas that are free of clutter and foliage (such as holding ponds and tank areas) can often be searched using slow-moving vehicles. However, if a mobile search is used, ensure that the driver is capable of easily identifying unusual objects or items that do not belong in the environment.

2. Q. Our plant has countless locations to hide a bomb and many locations that are difficult to physically search. What should we do in this situation?

A. Keep in mind, if it is very difficult to physically search a particular area (such as a series of pipes located 20’off the ground), it is probably equally difficult for a bomber to access this area. Unless the area includes equipment essential to process safety, focus on accessible areas with a higher probability of being used for bomb concealment.

3. Q. What should we do if the caller refused to provide a time of detonation in the threat?

A. Proceed with the plan just as if the caller did state a time of detonation. In most cases, if the detonation time is very short, the caller will provide a time of detonation.

In any case, never assume that the time of detonation is correct.

4. Q. What if the caller states a time of detonation too short to provide opportunity for a search of the facility?

A. If there is not enough time to conduct a search, it is usually best to evacuate and wait until at least 30-60 minutes after the stated detonation time before reoccupying the facility. If there are critical process operations that cannot be immediately shut down, safe shutdown activities should be initiated as soon as the decision to evacuate is made.

5. Q. What if our employees are not comfortable with the idea of searching for bombs and we do not have enough security personnel to use the security team search method?

A. If employees show reservations about conducting work area searches, advise them that arbitrary evacuation of the facility is often much more dangerous than remaining inside and searching their work areas. Remember, many bombs hidden in facilities are located in public areas close to entrances or exits—areas that people are likely to pass while evacuating the facility. If they are still resistant, try to recruit enough search team volunteers from the employee population to use the security search team method. Before developing the plan, send out a memo to all employees looking for volunteers. If this does not work, try recruiting search team members from the facility's hazmat or firefighter team. By virtue of their position, they have already assumed a degree of risk as part of their hazmat role.

6. Q. What does a bomb look like? What should we be looking for?

A. A bomb can look like anything—from a pack of cigarettes to a tractor-trailer! Though it is possible that a searcher might discover an "open" bomb (a bomb with visible components), most bombers conceal devices inside containers to hide the bomb's contents from view.

Do not look specifically for "bombs" during the search. Rather, look for unusual objects, items that are out-of-place, and possible signs of tampering that might indicate an attempt to conceal something.

7. Q. We have searched the facility and nothing was found. What should we do next?

A. There is no standard answer to this question. If there were signs of authenticity in the threat, it is usually wise to evacuate the facility until after the stated detonation time. If there were no indications of authenticity, the incident commander should decide whether to resume operations by considering the degree of risk, previous history of hoaxes at the facility, and any standing policies established by senior management.

Appendix C. Additional Resources

Consultants

Critical Intervention Services
1261 South Missouri Ave.
Clearwater, FL 33756
Tel. (727) 461-9417

Provides a range of security solutions for chemical industry clients, including risk/vulnerability assessment, security program design and development, security training, and protective services for high-risk installations.

Government Agencies

Canada

Royal Canadian Mounted Police
Canadian Bomb Data Center
1426 St. Joseph Blvd.
Glouchester, Ontario
Canada, K1A 0R2
Tel. 613.993.7880

Assesses trends in Canadian domestic explosives-related crimes. Publishes annual statistics summary of Canadian bomb and arson-related incidents.

United States

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF)
650 Massachusetts Ave. NW
Washington, DC 20226
Tel. 202.927.7777

Publishes annual arson and explosive incidents reports and basic planning guides on bomb-related security issues. Maintains AEXISdatabase of explosive and arson incidents.

Environmental Protection Agency
Chemical Emergency Preparedness & Prevention Office
1200 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
Washington, DC 20460
Tel. (202) 564-7777

EPA’s focal point for anti-terrorism initiatives in the chemical industry,

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
Bomb Data Center
J. Edgar Hoover Building, Room 3918
935 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, D.C. 20535-0001
Tel. 202.324.2696

Provides technical support for bomb-related investigation, assesses trends in domestic bombings, and provides training for law enforcement bomb technicians through the Hazardous Devices School.

U.S. Department of State
Overseas Security Advisory Council
Bureau of Diplomatic Security
Washington, D.C. 20522-1003
Tel. 202.663.0533

Provides information on regional terrorist and insurgent activity and special security issues for U.S. businesses with international operations.

Organizations

American Chemistry Council
1300 Wilson Blvd.
Arlington, VA 22209
Tel. (703) 741-5000

Supports the interests of American chemical companies. Requires appropriate security preparation as part of the ACC Responsible Care program. Publishes and distributes publications on security for chemical plants, including Site Security Guidelines for the U.S. Chemical Industry.

American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE)
Center for Chemical Process Safety
3 Park Avenue
New York, NY 10016-5991
Tel. (212) 591-7237

Provides publications and training on various issues pertaining to chemical process safety, including security preparation.

American Society for Industrial Security (ASIS)
1625 Prince Street
Alexandria, VA 22314-2818
Tel. 703.519.6200

Supports the interests of the security management community. Publishes and distributes books and other media on security issues. Hosts security-related conferences and training events.

International Association of Bomb Technicians and Investigators (IABTI)
P.O. Box 8629
Naples, FL 34101

Supports the interests of the bomb disposal and EOD community. Publishes bomb threat cards and awareness booklets. Can provide local points of contact for bomb squads and EODunits.

Security Training Media

Palladium Media Group, Inc.
P.O. Box 76040
St. Petersburg, FL 33761
Tel. (727) 897-9600

Produces the acclaimed Bomb Countermeasures for Security Professionals training and reference CD-ROM. Maintains anti-terrorism information clearinghouse at http://www.bombsecurity.com.